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Abstract
The returns to scale of marriage markets have important behavioral and welfare
consequences. It is quantitatively di¢ cult to estimate the returns to scale because, due
to endogenous migration, the marriage market size is endogenous. This paper addresses
the endogeneity in two ways. First, it estimates the degree of returns to scale in U.S.
marriage markets using the 2000 census. Given that in the United States people move
to cities to ￿nd marriage partners and, therefore, the size of the marriage market is
endogenous, we instrument the current size of a cohort in the marriage market with
the size of that cohort twenty years earlier. Second, it estimates city scale e⁄ects in
two societies￿ early Renaissance Tuscany and pre-reform China￿ where there was little
internal mobility, and thus, the size of the marriage market can be considered exoge-
nous. The main ￿nding is that in all three societies, there is no evidence of increasing
returns to scale in marriage markets, whereas the hypothesis of constant returns to scale
cannot be rejected. This is true when looking at marriage odds ratios, total gains to
marriage, and the quality of marital match. Given the di⁄erent characteristics of the
three societies in terms of population size, time period, economic structure, and social
norms characterizing the marriage market, the similarity and precision of the estimates
for returns to scale parameters is remarkable.
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11 Introduction
The returns to scale in marriage markets have important behavioral and welfare conse-
quences. The seminal paper by Mortensen (1988) raised the possibility of a thick market
externality or increasing returns to scale (IRS henceforth) in marriage markets. Under IRS,
a larger pool of eligible individuals searching for a marriage partner may lead to a higher
marriage rate in that market. From a social welfare perspective, there is too little search in
marriage markets with IRS.
In the theoretical literature, IRS is a popular assumption in models of marital search.
For example, Chiappori and Weiss (2000), and Anderberg and Mongrain (2001), adopt it
to motivate multiple equilibria in marriage and divorce rates, whereas Gautier, Svarer, and
Teulings (2005) use it to motivate their model of two way urban￿ rural migration and marital
search.
Alternatively, in a marriage market with constant returns to scale (CRS henceforth),
the marriage rate is independent of the size of the stock of eligibles, as in the static and
dynamic marriage market models of Choo and Siow (2006a, 2006b). Models in the Choo
Siow class are e¢ cient by assumption. Lastly, in the case of decreasing returns to scale
(DRS henceforth), the marriage rate falls as the stock of eligibles increases. Thus it is
important to quantitatively estimate the returns to scale in marriage markets.
In the empirical literature, researchers have begun to investigate the degree of returns
to scale in a marriage market. Following the empirical literature testing for agglomeration
e⁄ects in labor markets, a ￿rst approach is to use a city as the unit of observation and to
regress the marriage rate in a city on the size of the marriage market in that city.1 The
coe¢ cient on city size provides an estimate of the degree of returns to scale in marriage
markets. For example, using the 1970, 1980 and 1990 U.S. censuses, Gould and Paserman
(2003) estimate a probit regression of the probability of marriage of an eligible woman
on individual covariates including a measure of men￿ s wage inequality and log population
in the Metropolitan Area in which the woman resides. In the pooled regression, they
show that there are IRS in the marriage market. When they used ￿xed e⁄ects for the
321 Metropolitan Areas in their sample, the point estimate for log population becomes
statistically insigni￿cant.
The econometric problem that stems from using linear probability models when testing
for agglomeration e⁄ects is well known. If individuals who want to marry, choose to migrate
to cities, then the regression su⁄ers from the problem of endogeneity bias.
There is substantial empirical evidence showing that individuals choose to locate in
cities in order to engage in marital search or related activities. For example, Costa and
Kahn (2000) argue that educated couples are more likely to live in cities because it is easier
for both of them to ￿nd suitable jobs. Compton and Pollak (2004) suggest that cities are
attractive to both married and single educated individuals, and that the higher observed
rate of educated couples in cities relative to other types is partly because of the larger stock
of educated eligibles in cities. Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings (2005) show that in Denmark,
1Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) present a survey of the empirical literature testing for agglomeration
e⁄ects in labor markets and conclude that CRS is a reasonable description of the labor market data.
2single educated individuals are more likely to migrate to cities and married educated couples
are more likely to leave the cities. In Sweden, single women are more likely to migrate to
cities (Edlund 2005). Thus the problem of endogeneity bias in OLS or probit regressions
when testing for agglomeration e⁄ects in marriage markets has to be addressed.
Using the 1980 U.S. census, Drewianka (2003) deals with this problem by regressing the
propensity to marry for individuals of a particular gender on individual attributes and the
sex ratio (ratio of eligible men to women) of the city in which the individual resides. He
concludes that there are IRS in the marriage market. However, if the sex ratio in a city is
endogenous as argued above, the endogeneity problem is not solved.
The objective of our paper is to estimate the degree of returns to scale in marriage
markets by regressing the marriage rate (or a related variable) in a city on the number
of eligibles in that city. We deal with the endogeneity problem in two ways. First, when
moving to marry is an important concern, we implement an instrumental variables strategy.
Second, we use data from societies in which we can make an a priori argument that moving
to marry is not an issue.
We use data from three societies that are di⁄erent in many dimensions (e.g., time period,
area and population size, economic structure, and social norms governing the marriage
markets).
First, we study the United States as described in the 2000 census. Clearly, the assump-
tion of no in- or out-migration in cities is untenable here. To deal with the endogeneity
problem, for each city we use the size of the cohort twenty years earlier as an instrument for
the size of the same cohort in the year 2000. For example, when we analyze the marriage
rate of 25￿ 29 years old women in the 2000 census, we use the number of 5￿ 9 years old
women in the 1980 census in that city as an instrument for the number of 25￿ 29 year old
women in 2000. Our assumption is that children (or their parents) do not choose the city
in which to reside based on their marital prospects twenty years later.
Next, we consider two societies in which the endogeneity problem is not an issue because
people do not migrate for marriage purposes.
The ￿rst society is the city of Florence and her dominions consisting of Tuscan towns
and hundreds of villages in the countryside. Data on socio-economic characteristics come
from the 1427 Florentine Catasto, a census and property survey of about 60,000 Tuscan
households. The endogeneity problem is not a concern for early Renaissance Tuscany:
a sample of more than 7,200 dowry (marriage) contracts, which we collected at the State
Archives of Florence, indicate that Tuscan people did not migrate to ￿nd marriage partners.
The second society is the People￿ s Republic of China as described in the 1982 census.
Until 1978, internal mobility and particularly migration to cities was severely limited.2 After
1978, farmers began to obtain the right to temporarily migrate to small- and medium-size
cities to look for work. Even today, internal migration is restricted in China. Because the
census we use was conducted in 1982, we can assume that the population in each city is
essentially free from in-migration.
The main ￿nding is that in all three societies, there is no evidence of increasing returns
to scale when looking at marriage rate regressions. The hypothesis of constant returns
2See Goldstein and Goldstein (1990), Goldstein and Yang (1990), and Yang (1996a, 1996b).
3to scale cannot be rejected. More in detail, marriage rate regressions by gender at the
city level do not lend support for strong departures from the hypothesis of CRS in early
Renaissance Tuscan marriage markets and contemporary U.S. marriage markets. Chinese
marriage markets do not display IRS or CRS, but the point estimates suggest a mild DRS.
The same ￿ndings hold true when looking at total gains to marriage regressions. The
reason for estimating total gains to marriage regressions (in addition to marriage rate regres-
sions) is that the marriage rates of men and women in a marriage market must be related.
The marriage gain statistic, which has been proposed by Choo and Siow (2006), is a bi-
variate extension of the univariate gender-speci￿c marriage rates. The empirical results on
marriage rates and total gains to marriage from the three data sets and di⁄erent empirical
methods are consistent with each other: the hypothesis of CRS cannot be rejected.
An important caveat is in order. Even if we ￿nd that the marriage rate in a city is
independent of the number of eligibles in that city, a thick market externality may still
exist. The reason is that agents may react to a thick market externality, with faster arrivals
of potential partners and/or more disperse match value distribution, by waiting for a better
match rather than marrying earlier. In this case, the thick market externality generates
higher marital output but not necessarily a higher marriage rate. Because women have a
￿nite amount of time to bear children, they may choose to marry in a narrow age window
even if the pool of potential partners is poor. If the pool of partners increases, women may
continue to marry in that age window but now they may be able to ￿nd better matches.
Addressing this issue is similar to what has been done in the labor markets literature.
For example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2005) estimate a structural model of search and
unemployment with scale e⁄ects. They show that the unemployment hazard is una⁄ected
by scale e⁄ects. Scale e⁄ects lead to higher reservation wages and higher post-employment
wages. This means that it is possible for scale e⁄ects to show up in the quality of the match
rather than in a higher matching rate.
For the U.S. 2000 sample we study scale e⁄ects on the average quality of the marital
match using two proxies of average marital output: (i) the fraction of young children who
live with two parents, and (ii) the educational attainment of children within marriage. We
do not use the divorce rate or marital tenure to proxy for marital quality because one
can argue that married individuals in larger cities may also choose to break up more and
rematch more and they still have higher average welfare. The marital output evidence does
not support the hypothesis that larger marriage markets result in higher average marital
output, that is, there is no evidence of a thick market externality even when we consider
the quality of the marital match.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodological approach.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 present the datasets and empirical ￿ndings for the United States in
2000, Tuscany in 1427, and China in 1982, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
Marriage Odds Ratio Regressions. Using a city as a unit of observation, let c
denote city c, f denote type f women and m denote type m men. ￿c
f is the number of
4married women of type f in city c. nc
f is the number of eligible women of type f in city c.
￿c
m is the number of married men of type m in city c. nc
m is the number of eligible men of
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The behavioral justi￿cation for studying the log odds ratio is that it can be derived from
McFadden￿ s (1974) random utility model where the choice is between marriage or other-
wise.3 Under McFadden￿ s interpretation, the log odds ratio, that is the left-hand side of
(1), measures the mean di⁄erence in utility of type g in city c from marrying versus not
marrying.
Estimating the parameters ￿f and ￿m enables to assess the degree of returns to scale
in marriage markets. Under CRS, ￿f = ￿m = 0. Under IRS, ￿f > 0 and ￿m > 0. Under
DRS, ￿f < 0 and ￿m < 0.
To understand the empirical ￿ndings in the next sections, it is important to discuss
orders of magnitude. In general, for any city, a doubling of its population is a very large




g, is 0.8. Then a doubling of
the city￿ s population will increase the marriage rate to 0.801 if ￿g = 0:01, and to 0.81 if




g, be 0.5. Then a doubling
of the city￿ s population will increase the marriage rate to 0.5017 if ￿g = 0:01, and to 0.517
if ￿g = 0:1. This implies that population growth in a city will generate a more modest
increase in the marriage rate if the initial marriage rate in that city is higher.
In general, the di¢ culty with estimating the above regressions by OLS is the potential
endogeneity of nc
m and nc
f due to endogenous migration to cities to ￿nd marriage partners.
In order to obtain consistent OLS estimates of ￿f and ￿m, one has to make an a priori
argument that nc
m and nc
f are exogenous. Net migration across cities due to di⁄erences
in labor market conditions and ameneties is ￿ne because migration unrelated to marital
behavior generates exogenous variation in nc
m and nc
f across marriage markets, which is




A standard concern in regression inference is when a covariate, nc
g in our case, appears
on both the right- and left-hand sides of the equation. If this covariate is measured with
error, then measurement error may cause a correlation between the covariate and the de-
pendent variable causing the OLS estimate of ￿g to be inconsistent. Since there is sampling
error in observed nc
g, the estimation strategy may have a potential problem. However, this
is not a ￿rst order problem in our case because the marriage odds ratio is independent of the
sampling error in nc
g.4 There is still the conventional problem of measurement error in ob-
served nc
g. We will deal with this issue in two ways. First, we estimate population weighted









g is the measured population, n
c
g is the true population and u
c
g is the
5regressions where smaller cities, which should su⁄er from more sampling error, have less
weight. Second, our instrumental variables technique should alleviate the measurement
error problem.
Total Gains to Marriage Regressions. Independent of the problem of endogeneity
bias, ￿c
f and ￿c
m are not independent of each other. Because each heterosexual marriage
consists of a man and a woman, the marriage rate of type m men must be related to the
marriage rate of type f women if they marry each other. However, estimating (1) for men
and women separately does not impose the restriction that ￿f and ￿m are related. Type f
women can marry type m men, as well as other types of men, and type m men can marry
type f women, as well as other types of women. These substitution possibilities make the
relationship between ￿f and ￿m complicated. As Angrist (2004) and Choo and Siow (2006)
have shown, separate male and female marriage rate regressions can give con￿ icting results.
To deal with the above problem, we also estimate total gains to marriage regressions.




















mf is the number of fm;fg marriages in city c. ￿c
m0 and ￿c
f0 are the numbers of
type m men and type f women in city c who choose to remain unmarried, respectively.
Following Choo and Siow (2006), who derive total gains to marriage by embedding
McFadden￿ s random utility model in a marriage market, we behaviorally interpret total
gains to marriage as an average of the mean utilities of the two types of individuals married





represents the mean utility that a type m man (type f woman) obtains from marrying a
type f woman (type m man) relative to remaining unmarried, in (2) the total gain to a
fm;fg marriage is the average of the male and female log marriage odds ratios.
To estimate the degree of returns to scale in marriage markets, consider the following


















￿mf estimates the common total gains to a type m;f marriage across all cities. ￿mf
measures the degree of returns to scale. If ￿mf = 0, the marriage market is characterized
by CRS. If ￿mf > 0, the marriage market displays IRS. vc
mf is an error term, which allows
for idiosyncratic deviations of total gains to marriage across di⁄erent cities.
sampling error. As long as the marriage rate, r
c














6In the above speci￿cation, the coe¢ cients on male and female populations are restricted
to be the same, ￿mf, which means that doubling the population will increase total gains to
marriage by 2￿mf percent. Given that male and female populations across cities are highly
collinear, if we allow for gender-speci￿c population coe¢ cients, multicollinearity results in
unstable and implausible point estimates.
Like in (1), nc
m and nc
f in (3) are potentially endogenous. If the idiosyncratic gain to
marriage in city c, vc
mf; is large, individuals may want to move to city c to ￿nd a marriage
partner and, therefore, nc
m and nc
f may also be large, leading to an upward bias in the OLS
estimate of ￿mf. On the other hand, sampling error in the number of eligibles, nc
m and nc
f,
may lead to a negative correlation between the covariate and total gains to marriage. This
implies that the OLS estimate of ￿mf will be biased downward. As discussed in the case
of log marriage odds ratio regressions, this sampling error is unlikely to be important. We
will use OLS and also instrument for (lnnc
m + lnnc
f) in (3).
Marital Output Regressions. A caveat to our empirical approach is necessary. Even
if we ￿nd that the marriage rate in a city is independent of the number of eligibles in that
city, a thick market externality may still exist. The reason is that agents may react to a
thick market externality, with faster arrivals of potential partners and/or a more disperse
match value distribution, by waiting for a better match rather than marrying earlier. In
this case, the thick market externality generates higher marital output but not necessarily
a higher marriage rate. Because women have a ￿nite amount of time to bear children, they
may choose to marry in a narrow age window even if their pool of potential partners is poor.
If the pool of partners increases, women may continue to marry in that age window but
now they may be able to ￿nd better matches. In Section 3.3 we will provide some evidence
on this alternative hypothesis on how individuals may react to thick market externalities.
We now present the datasets and discuss the results.
3 United States, 2000
For the United States we use the 5 percent random sample of the 2000 census. We use the
sample weights to calculate our population counts.
Since there is unrestricted mobility in the United States, the population in each city
must be regarded as endogenous in the marriage rate or marriage gains regressions. To
address this endogeneity problem, for a particular category of individuals in a city, we use
the number of individuals in that group 20 years younger to instrument for the number of
the same individuals in the year 2000. For example, we instrument the number of men in
the 27￿ 31 age group in a city in the year 2000 with the number of male children in the 7￿ 11
age group in that city in the year 1980. Our assumption is that children (or their parents)
do not choose the city in which to reside based on their marital prospects twenty years later.
There are 248 cities in the sample and we use the census de￿nition of a standard
metropolitan statistical area, SMSA, for a city. The smallest city in the sample has 105,000
individuals, whereas the largest city has 9,700,000 individuals. Across cities, the average
7population is 810,787, which is consistent with the well-known fact that most cities in the
United States have less than 1 million individuals.
Table 1 displays summary statistics where each city is an observation.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
We consider men in the 27￿ 31 age group and women in the 25￿ 29 age group. The mean
marriage rates for men and women are 0.485 and 0.508, respectively. As one can see, there is
substantial variation in marriage rates across cities. One standard deviation of the marriage
rates exceeds 0.06, which is more than 10% of the mean marriage rates across cities.
The mean total gains to marriage for men in the 27￿ 31 age group married to women
in the 25￿ 29 age group is ￿ 0.567. One standard deviation is 0.278, which means that in
most cities total gains to marriage are negative. A negative total gain to a speci￿c marriage
match is not unusual. It means that a marriage match that is imposed on a randomly chosen
fm;fg couple will generally be worse than having the couple remaining umarried. Type m
and type f individuals who choose to marry each other are not randomly drawn from the
fm;fg population. These couples, compared with other m and f individuals who do not
choose to marry each other, have high idiosyncratic payo⁄s from marrying each other.
3.1 City Size and Marriage Rates
Table 2 presents log marriage odds ratio weighted regressions at the city level with popula-
tion weights. The dependent variable is the log of the number of married individuals divided
by the number of unmarried individuals by gender and age. The independent variable is
the log of the number of individuals in the same gender and age groups.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Column (1) indicates that the coe¢ cient for men in the 27￿ 31 age group is ￿ 0.133 with
a standard error of 0.021, which implies slight DRS for men in the marriage market.
Adding (in column 2) the proportions of black and white men in that age group, the
proportion of men with college degree, the mean and the variance of income of men in the
27￿ 31 age group as covariates, the point estimate increases to ￿ 0.028 with a standard error
of 0.024. Now ￿m = 0 is in the con￿dence interval and we can no longer reject CRS.
The negative sign of the coe¢ cient of the variance of family income of men indicates
that in cities with more family income dispersion, which is consistent with Gould and
Passerman￿ s observation that marriage is delayed when there is more heterogeneity in the
family incomes that these men are associated with.
To deal with the endogeneity problem, column (3) instruments the log number of men
in the 27￿ 31 age group with the log number of men 20 years younger, that is, with the
number of 7￿ 11 years old male children in 1980.5 The point estimate becomes ￿ 0.048 with
5The ￿rst stage IV regression is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
8a standard error of 0.028. The IV point estimate is slightly more negative than the OLS
estimate.6
Both the OLS and IV estimates do not reject CRS. Given the standard errors, using a
95% con￿dence interval, the point estimate for ￿m will not exceed 0.01, which means that
even in the best case for IRS, the quantitative e⁄ect is very modest. From Table 1, the
mean marriage rate across cities is 0.485. Using our discussion of order of magnitude in
Section 2, a doubling of the population of a city will increase the marriage rate of men by
less than half percent. Recall that there is substantial variation in marriage rates across
cities (in Table 1 the standard deviation of marriage rates for men across cities is 0.063,
which exceeds 10% of the mean marriage rate). However, the ￿ndings in Table 2 indicate
that variation in city size alone cannot explain the variation in male marriage rates across
cities.
Columns (4￿ 6) run the same regressions for women in the 25￿ 29 age group. In column (4)
the point estimate is ￿ 0.166 with a standard error of 0.030 so we can reject the hypothesis
of CRS at the 5% signi￿cance level. When we include (in column 5) the proportions of
black and white women in that age group, the proportion of women with college degree,
the mean and the variance of income of women in the 25￿ 29 age group as covariates, the
point estimate increases to ￿ 0.010 with a standard error of 0.026. Now we cannot reject the
hypothesis of CRS at the 10% signi￿cance level.
Also for women, the coe¢ cient of the variance of family income is negative, which is
consistent with the delay argument set forth by Gould and Paserman (2003): when the
pool of women￿ s family incomes are more dispersed, men also delay their marriage to ￿nd
a better match.
Column (6) instruments the log number of women in the 25￿ 29 age group with the log
number of women 20 years younger. The point estimate drops slightly to ￿ 0.021 with a
standard error of 0.030. Here we cannot reject the hypothesis of DRS at the 5% signi￿cance
level. However, the magnitude of the DRS is modest: the 95% con￿dence interval upper
bound is 0.04. From Table 1, the mean marriage rate for women across cities is 0.508. A
doubling of the population in a city will increase the marriage rate of women by less than
half percent. As explained above, recall that there is substantial variation in marriage rates
across cities (in Table 1 the standard deviation of marriage rates for women across cities
is 0.069, which exceeds 10% of the mean marriage rate). The ￿ndings in Table 2 indicate
that variation in city size alone cannot explain the variation in female marriage rates across
cities. Both estimates of the returns to scale using male and female marriage odd ratios in
Table 2 are consistent with each other.
Two caveats are in order. First, if in large cities individuals are more likely to divorce,
using the number of currently married individuals may undercount the number of marriages
in large cities and explain the absence of increasing returns to scale. To check for this possi-
bility, we also investigate log marriage odds ratio regressions using ever married individuals
instead of currently married individuals (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The evidence for
DRS is even stronger. A possible interpretation is that in larger cities, there may be less
6As expected, the more negative IV estimate suggests that measurement error in the covariate is more
important than having the number of individuals in both the right- and left-hand sides of the regression.
9stigma from getting divorced and not remarrying.
Second, to check the issue of delay, that is, the possibility that in large cities with a large
pool of eligibles, individuals may wait and delay marriage, we also run marriage odds ratio
regressions for currently married in older age groups: men age 37￿ 41 and women age 35￿ 39.
The results (Table A3 in the Appendix) are similar to the ones for the younger individuals:
there is no evidence of IRS. There is some slight evidence of DRS and in most regressions,
we cannot reject CRS. However, unlike for young women who seem to wait when there is
more dispersion in the pool of eligibles (measured by the variance of incomes), older women
do not delay their marriages when faced with a more dispersed pool of potential partners.
To sum up the ￿ndings from the marriage odds ratio regressions, we can conclude that,
unlike Angrist (2004) and Choo and Siow (2006), these regressions tell a consistent story:
CRS cannot be rejected as a ￿rst approximation in U.S. contemporary marriage markets.7
3.2 City Size and Total Gains to Marriage
In order to impose marriage market clearing on our estimation, Table 3 presents total gains
to marriage (￿mf) weighted regressions at the city level for men in the 27￿ 31 age group
and for women in the 25￿ 29 age group. The dependent variable is the log of the number
of marriages among men and women in the two age groups minus the log of the geometric
average of the number of unmarried individuals in the corresponding age groups. The
independent variable of interest is 1
2(lnnm + lnnf), the log of the geometric mean of the
number of men and women in the corresponding age groups.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
In Column (1) the point estimate for ￿mf is -0.047 with a standard error of 0.010. We
can reject ￿mf = 0, CRS, at the 5% signi￿cance level. When adding in column (2) the
proportions of black and white individuals in that age group, the proportion of individuals
with college degree, and the mean and variance of family income as covariates, the point
estimate increases to 0.010 with a standard error of 0.011, and, therefore, we cannot reject
￿mf = 0, CRS. Columns (3) and (4) instrument 1
2(lnnm+lnnf) with the log of the number
of individuals twenty years younger, that is, with the size of the cohort of men who were
7￿ 11 years old and of women who were 5￿ 9 years old in 1980. Without other covariates, the
point estimate is -0.045 with a standard error of 0.011. So we can reject ￿mf = 0, CRS, at
the 5% signi￿cance level. When adding the other covariates, the point estimate increases
to 0.011 with a standard error of 0.013, which means we cannot reject CRS.
Although the IV point estimates are slightly larger than the OLS estimates, both sets
of estimates tell the same story. Moreover, the standard errors in all the regressions are
small and similar. The largest point estimate on 1
2(lnnm +lnnf) from column (4) is 0.011.
Given a standard error of 0.013, the upper bound of the 95% con￿dence interval for ￿mf
is 0.037. Doubling the population will increase total gains by ￿mf ln2 = 0:025. From
7Note that Angrist (2004) and Choo and Siow (2006) ask di⁄erent substantive questions unrelated to the
issues discussed here.
10Table 1, the standard deviation of total gains to marriage across cities is 0.277. Using the
95% con￿dence interval upper bound estimate and the discussion of orders of magnitude in
Section 2, a doubling of the population will explain less than 10% of a standard deviation
in total gains. Under the most favorable interpretation, there is a slight evidence in favor
of IRS.
Although the size of the marriage market seems largely not to a⁄ect total gains to
marriage, other factors do a⁄ect total gains to marriage in a city. In both columns (2) and
(4), as can be anticipated from the increment in R2, the P-values that all the other variables
are di⁄erent from zero are smaller than 0.001.
Again, to control for the issue of delay, we also estimate total gains to marriage regres-
sions for older individuals (Table A4 in the Appendix): men in the 37￿ 41 age group and
women in the 35￿ 39 age group. The ￿ndings are the same: we cannot reject CRS. We also
estimate total gains to marriage regressions where each observation gets the same weight.
The results are not qualitatively di⁄erent from the weighted regressions.
3.3 City Size and Marital Match Quality
Tables 2 and 3 above indicate that when looking at marriage rates and total gains to
marriage, CRS is a reasonable assumption for marriage markets in the United States.
However, despite these ￿ndings, a thick market externality may still exist in these mar-
riage markets, in the sense that individuals in larger markets have faster arrival of potential
matches and/or a more dispersed match value distribution to draw from. As is well known
from the sequential search literature (e.g., Mortensen 1986), both of these e⁄ects may lead
to delayed marriages in larger markets, thus lowering observed marriage rates and marriage
gains. Thus our empirical evidence on marriage rates and marriage gains may still be con-
sistent with IRS. Addressing this issue is similar to what has been done in the labor markets
literature. For example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2005) estimate a structural model of
search and unemployment with scale e⁄ects. They show that the unemployment hazard is
una⁄ected by scale e⁄ects. Scale e⁄ects lead to higher reservation wages and higher post-
employment wages. This means that scale e⁄ects may show up in the quality of the match
rather than in a higher matching rate.
We can shed some light on this issue by looking at two measures of marital match quality:
(i) the proportion of children age 1￿ 6 living with two parents, and (ii) the educational
attainment of 16-year old children of married parents. We do not use the divorce rate or
marital tenure to proxy for marital quality because one can argue that married individuals
in larger cities may also choose to break up more and rematch more and they still have
higher average welfare.
A major reason why individuals marry is to have children. We use the proportion of
1￿ 6 years old children, who live with two parents in a city, as a measure of average marital
match quality in that city. Figure 1 shows a plot of log(proportion of children age 1￿ 6 who
live with two parents) against log(population) in that city.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
11As can be seen in the scatter plot and the non-parametric regression line, there is little
evidence that average match quality is increasing in city size. There is an increase for the
largest cities but there are few observations there.
Table 4 presents population weighted regressions of the ln(proportion of children 1￿ 6
who live with two parents) on ln(population) and covariates.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The point estimate in column (1), -0.016, shows no relationship between the proportion
of children age 1￿ 6, who live with two parents, and log population in a city. When controlling
in column (2) for the proportions of black and white men and women in the 27￿ 31 and 25￿ 29
age groups, respectively, and for the proportions of those individuals with college degrees,
the estimated coe¢ cient, -0.015, is still zero at the 5% signi￿cance level. Column (3) adds
regional dummies. This speci￿cation does show a statistically signi￿cant negative estimated
coe¢ cient, -0.015, at the 5% signi￿cance level, which is consistent with the negative slope for
the largest cities in Figure 1. Weighting the observations by population size gives increasing
weight to larger cities, and therefore, this negative slope is driven by very few observations.
When we rerun the regressions treating all observations equally, the estimated coe¢ cients
on log population are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5% signi￿cance level in all
speci￿cations. Thus, the ￿ndings in Table 4 indicate that delay in marriage does not seem
to increase average marital match quality as proxied by the proportion of children age 1￿ 6,
who live with two parents. If anything, there is some evidence that the largest cities reduce
marital match quality.
A possible objection to using the proportions of children age 1￿ 6 living with two parents
as a proxy for average marital match quality is another endogeneity problem: if married
individuals leave a city (for example, when they have children, they decide to move to
the suburbs), then cities may be left with unmarried individuals who are still hoping to
marry. If there are IRS, larger cities with their higher actual marriage rates, may not have
higher observed marriage rates if married individuals leave the cities at a higher rate than
unmarried individuals. Since we use the metropolitan de￿nition of a city (SMSA), which
includes the nearby suburbs, this endogeneity problem of leaving the city after marriage
should not be a ￿rst order problem for the regressions in Table 4.
The second proxy for the quality of marital match is the educational attainment of
16-year old children of married parents. Age 16 is chosen because most of these children
are still living with their parents and a non-trivial proportion of them is behind their birth
cohort in terms of attained years of schooling. This proxy does not su⁄er of the endogeneity
problem described above: by looking at the educational attainment of 16-year old children,
we are basically comparing the average marital match quality of couples in small cities, who
did not leave the city after marriage, with the average marital match quality of couples in
large cities, who did not leave the city after marriage. Table 5 presents the results of two
regressions.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
12In column (1), the number of years of education of 16-year old children with married
parents in a city is regressed on the log population of that city, father￿ s age, mother￿ s age,
father￿ s years of schooling, mother￿ s years of schooling, and dummy variables for father￿ s
and mother￿ s races. The point estimate indicates that, controlling for parents￿education,
a 1% increase in the population size of a city decreases the years of schooling of a 16-year
old by 0.004 years. However, the standard error, which is clustered by city, shows that the
point estimate is not statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 10% signi￿cance level.
Column (2) reports the results of a linear probability model where the dependent variable
is equal to 1 if the 16 year-old child of a couple attained the median years of education of
16-year old children in his or her state, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coe¢ cient on log
population is 0.012 but again the standard error, which is clustered by city, shows that the
point estimate is not statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 10% signi￿cance level.
The two regressions lead to similar conclusions. Marital output, as proxied by the
educational attainment of 16-year old children, does not rise with city size. Also, regardless
of which proxy for mariatl match quality, this evidence on marital output is unlikely to be
a⁄ected by the out-migration of married couples from the city.
In both regressions, the estimated coe¢ cients on the interaction between the parents￿
years of schooling are positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. So
there is evidence of gains in marital quality, as proxied by educational attainment of the
children, by matching by education of the parents. It should be clear that gains from
marital matching is separate from the question of whether the degree of returns to scale in
the marriage market.
To sum up the ￿ndings for U.S. marriage markets in the year 2000, we conclude that
there is no evidence of IRS, whereas the hypothesis of CRS cannot be rejected. A thick
market externality is rejected when one looks at marriage rates and totals gains to marriage
(Tables 2 and 3), as well as at marital match quality (Tables 4 and 5).
Given the potential endogeneity of marriage market size in the United States, the cred-
ibility of our ￿ndings is predicated upon the exogeneity of our instruments for population
vectors. While we have made apriori arguments for the exogeneity of these instrumental
variables, we cannot externally validate the exogeneity assumption.
We now turn our attention to two societies in which the potential endogeneity problem
that characterizes U.S. marriage markets does not exist. Both in early Renaissance Tuscany
and in China in 1982 individuals did not move to cities to search for marriage partners.
Therefore, we can assume that in these two societies the size of the marriage market is
exogenous.
4 Tuscany, 1427
Late medieval and early Renaissance Tuscany was one of the most urban and commercial
economies in Europe, with Florence being one of the most important trade and banking
centers. The other Tuscan towns under Florentine rule (e.g., Pisa, Prato, Arezzo, Pistoia,
San Gimignano) were also commercial economies, though on a smaller scale. The rest of
Tuscany consisted of hundreds of rural villages, with a mix of farmers, who owned and
13worked on their farms, and sharecroppers and ￿xed-rent tenants, who worked on the farms
owned by town- and village-dwellers.
Two features of Tuscan marriage markets are relevant for our study. First, early Renais-
sance Tuscany was a virilocal society in which daughters left their natal households upon
marriage and moved into their in-laws￿households, whereas most married sons continued to
live with, and work for, their parents (Botticini 1999; and Botticini and Siow 2003). Second,
Tuscan people rarely moved to other towns or villages for the purpose of marriage as shown
in Table 6, which illustrates the place of residence of the bride￿ s and groom￿ s families for a
sample of more than 7000 dowry and marriage contracts we collected at the State Archives
of Florence.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
From the thirteenth to the ￿fteenth century, the vast majority of urban grooms married
urban brides, and vice versa, rural grooms mainly married rural brides. There were very
few instances of an urban groom marrying a rural bride, or vice versa. This implies that
the size of the marriage market in Tuscan cities and villages can be taken as exogenous.
The data on marriage matches come from the machine readable data ￿le Census and
Property Survey of Florentine Dominions in the Province of Tuscany, 1427-1480, prepared
by David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (1978).8 Faced with a ￿scal crisis because
of the protracted warfare against the duchy of Milan, in 1427 the Priors of the Florentine
Republic instituted a new tax survey for all citizens of the city of Florence, the Tuscan
towns, and hundreds of villages in her territories. Government o¢ cials and their sta⁄s
interviewed every head of household in Tuscany, for a total of more than 60,000 households
(about 260,000 people). The survey, completed within a few months, included information
on all real property (houses in the city, farms and land holdings), business investments,
loans, shares of the public debt, debts, occupations, and household demographics (number,
gender, and age of children and other household members).
The machine readable data ￿le divides the Tuscan population into 29 distinct series
(Table A5 in the Appendix). For the purpose of our study, each series is labeled as one
distinct ￿district, ￿where each district corresponds to either a city (town) or to the rural area
surrounding a city (town). There was clearly a large variance in the size of the population,
and hence, of marriage markets, in each of the 29 districts. For example, district no. 1
corresponds to the city of Florence, which had 9780 households, whereas district no. 18
consists of the villages in the Garfagnana rural area, which hosted a tiny population of only
175 households.
8The tax survey on which the Catasto data are based, and the documentary sources for the Catasto, are
fully described in David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (1978), Les Toscans et leurs familles: Un
Øtude du catasto Florentin de 1427 (English abridged edition: Tuscans and their Families: A Study of the
Florentine Catasto of 1427. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
144.1 City Size and Marriage Rates
Figure 2 describes the marriage behavior of individuals surveyed in the 1427 census. Women
married in a very narrow age window, 15￿ 25, whereas men married much later.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
We consider men in the 22￿ 32 and women in the 18￿ 27 age groups, respectively. Table
7 indicates that women￿ s marriage rate was very high: 73% of 18￿ 27 years old women were
married versus 52% of 22￿ 32 years old men.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
Because of the lack of mobility for marital reasons in early Renaissance Tuscany, reverse
causality is not a concern and, therefore, we can investigate the returns to scale hypothesis
using OLS.
Table 8 presents log marriage odds ratio population weighted regressions at the district
level. The dependent variable is the log of the number of married individuals divided by
the number of unmarried individuals by gender and age. The independent variable is the
log of the number of individuals in the same gender and age group. As these are log linear
regressions, the point estimates are interpretable as elasticities.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
Column (1) indicates that a 1% increase in the number of women in the 18￿ 27 age group
results in a 0.038% decrease in the marital odds ratio for women in that age group. Since
the standard error is 0.107, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of CRS (￿f = 0) at any
reasonable signi￿cance level.
Column (2) includes the average log assets per adult in the district, that is, the average
wealth per adult in the district. Again, the size of the marriage market in a given age group
does not a⁄ect the probability of being married in that age group. Also wealth per adult
does not a⁄ect the odds of being married.
In columns (3) and (4), we instrument the log of the number of women in the 18￿ 27 age
group with the log total population of the district. Again, there is no e⁄ect of the size of
marriage market on the number of marriages in that age group.
So for women in the 18￿ 27 age groups, we cannot reject the hypothesis of CRS (￿f = 0)
in marriage markets at the district level. There is also no discernible e⁄ect of average wealth
in a given district on the marriage rate of women.
Columns (5)-(8) present the results for 22￿ 32 years old men. The OLS point estimate for
￿m in column (5) is -0.035 with a standard error of 0.153. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that ￿m = 0 (CRS) at the 10% signi￿cance level. When adding in column (6) the average
log assets per adult in the district for that male age group, the OLS point estimate for ￿m is
15-0.037 with a standard error of 0.056. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ￿m = 0
(CRS) at the 10% signi￿cance level. The point estimate for average log assets per adult in
the district is -0.353 with a standard error of 0.089. Thus, unlike women whose marriage
rates did not seem to be a⁄ected by the average wealth in the district, 22￿ 32 years old men
in richer districts were more likely to remain unmarried.
In columns (7) and (8), we instrument the log of the number of men in the 22￿ 32 age
group with the log total population of the district. Again, there is no e⁄ect of the size of the
marriage market on the number of marriages of that male age group. The point estimate
for average log assets per adult in the district is -0.353 with a standard error of 0.090.
Consistent with the OLS results, 22￿ 32 years old men in richer districts were more likely
to be unmarried. In general, the OLS and corresponding IV point estimates and standard
errors are very similar. Thus, there is no evidence of endogenous mobility in a district for
marital reasons, which is consistent with our prior.
We also run unweighted regressions and the results are quantitatively similar to those in
Table 8. Thus when looking at both OLS and IV, weighted or unweighted, male or female
marriage odds ratio speci￿cations, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ￿m = ￿f = 0, that
is, the hypothesis of CRS. However, because of the small number of districts (observations)
and the relatively large standard errors, it is premature to reject modest IRS. For example,
we often cannot also reject the hypothesis that ￿m = ￿f = 0:1: The marriage rates for
22-32 year old men and 18-27 year old women were 0.518 and 0.838 respectively. Assuming
the upper bound estimates ￿m = ￿f = 0:1 and using the orders of magnitude calculations
in Section 2, a doubling of the population will increase the marriage rate by less than 4%
and 2% for men and women respectively.
4.2 City Size and Total Gains to Marriage
Table 9 presents unweighted total gains to marriage regressions at the district level for men
in the 22￿ 32 age group and for women in the 18￿ 27 age group. The dependent variable is
the log of the number of marriages among men and women in the two age groups divided
by the geometric mean of the number of unmarried men and women in the two age groups.
The independent variable is the log of the geometric mean of the numbers of individuals in
the two age groups .
[TABLE 9 HERE]
Column (1) indicates that the OLS point estimate of ￿mf is -0.012 with a standard error
of 0.131. Column (2) includes the average log assets per adult in the district. The OLS
point estimate for ￿mf is -0.027 with a standard error of 0.092. Neither estimate can reject
the hypothesis that ￿mf = 0 (CRS) at standard con￿dence intervals. The point estimate
for log assets per adult in the district is -0.206 with a standard error of 0.149. So there is
some evidence that wealthier districts lower total gains to marriage between 18￿ 27 years
old women and 22￿ 32 years old men.
In columns (3) and (4), we instrument the log of the geometric mean of the numbers of
individuals in the two age groups with the log population in the district. In column (3), the
16IV estimate is 0.021 with a standard error of 0.132. When including the average log assets
per adult in the district, the IV point estimate in column (4) is 0.009 with a standard error
of 0.100. Also, the IV point estimate for average log assets shows that wealthier districts
have a negative impact on total gains to marriage between 18￿ 27 years old women and
22￿ 32 men years old men suggesting that wealthier individuals delay marriage.
We also run unweighted total gains to marriage regressions and obtain similar results.
Whatever speci￿cation we run, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ￿mf = 0, that is, the
hypothesis of CRS. However, because of the small number of observations and the relatively
large standard errors, it is premature to reject modest IRS. For example on a few occasions,
we cannot also reject the hypothesis that ￿mf = 0:2 at the 5% con￿dence interval. If
￿mf = 0:2; a doubling of the population will increase total gains to marriage by 0:2￿ln2 =
0:139, which is 27% of the standard deviation of total gains to marriage across districts.
These estimates are the largest returns to scale estimates in this paper.
5 China, 1982
The data comes from the 1982 census, which is a 1 percent random sample of the population.
We restrict our analysis to people living in the 245 cities identi￿ed in the census.
Until 1978, internal migration in China was strictly restricted and residents of cities had
to live in the cities where they were born. After 1978, at the same time when economic
reforms in the countryside started being implemented, migration restrictions from rural to
small￿and medium￿ size cities began to be relaxed. Even though the pace of social and
economic changes has been enormous since 1978, internal migration is still restricted in
China. At the time of the 1982 census, most residents had no choice about where they
could live, and even if individuals wanted to migrate across cities for marital purpose, they
could not do so (Goldstein and Goldstein 1990).
Only under two circumstances internal migration was relatively free. First, individuals
who got into institutions of higher education were allowed to move there. In 1982, though,
few Chinese people had higher education. Second, individuals could move to another city if
a ￿rm was willing to hire them. However, because there was no free market for labor, very
few people moved for this reason.
This restricted and limited internal migration makes the endogeneity problem not a
issue when we use the 1982 Chinese census to study the e⁄ect of city size on marriage rates.
Au and Henderson (forthcoming) also exploited labor immobility across and into Chinese
cities to study other agglomeration e⁄ects of cities.
Since there was little divorce in China in that time period, the marriage rate in the 1982
census refers to permanent marriages.
5.1 City Size and Marriage Rates
Table 10 shows summary statistics for the Chinese data. There were 244 (OR 245???????)
cities. We study the marital status of men in the 24￿ 28 and 29￿ 33 age groups, and women
in the 21￿ 25 and 26￿ 30 age groups. Each age group has over 70,000 observations.
17[TABLE 10 HERE]
By age 30, marriage was essentially universal for women: 46 percent of women in the
21￿ 25 age group was married, whereas 97 percent of women in the 26￿ 30 age group was
married. For young and old men, the percentages of married were 58 and 90 percent,
respectively. Ninety six percent of men and ninety two percent of women in the two age
cohorts had completed primary school.
Table 11 presents marriage odds ratio OLS regressions at the city level. Each observation
is weighted by the population of the city. The dependent variable is, by gender and age, the
log of the number of married individuals divided by the number of unmarried individuals.
The independent variable is the log of the number of individuals in the same gender and
age group.
[TABLE 11 HERE]
Column (1) indicates that a 1% increase in the number of women in the 21￿ 25 age group
results in a 0.35% decrease in the number of marriages in that age group. This estimate is
statistically signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Columns (2) adds the log odds ratio of women in the 21￿ 25 age group, who have com-
pleted primary education in a given city. The point estimate implies a population elasticity
of -0.17. It continues to be statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. The estimated
coe¢ cient on log odds ratio of education is negative, consistent with the hypothesis that
educated women delay marriage. The negative estimated population elasticities suggests
that there may be some delay in marriage in larger cities.
Column (3) runs the same log marriage odds ratio regression for women in the 31￿ 35 age
group. The estimated population elasticity is -0.24, which is statistically signi￿cant at the
10% level. Column (4) adds the log odds of primary education. The estimated population
elasticity becomes -0.02 and not statistically di⁄erent from zero. Although the standard
error is reasonably small, here we cannot reject the hypothesis that ￿f = 0:1 at the 95%
con￿dence interval. If ￿f = 0:1, a doubling of the population will increase the marriage
rate by 2%. The point estimate for ￿f suggests a much smaller increase, if any. The results
in columns (3) and (4) do not suggest any strong departure from CRS in long run female
marriage rates.
Columns (5)￿ (8) run similar regressions for men in the 24￿ 28 age group. Column (5)
indicates that a 1% increase in the number of men in the 24￿ 28 age group results in a
0.23% decrease in the number of marriages in that age group. This estimate is statistically
signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Columns (6) adds the log odds of men in the same age group, who have completed
primary education in a given city. The point estimate implies a population elasticity of
-0.17, which is almost the same as the women￿ s point estimate in column (2), and it is
statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coe¢ cient on log odds of
education is negative, albeit not statistically di⁄erent from zero. The negative estimated
population elasticities suggests that there may be some delay in marriage in larger cities.
18Column (7) runs the same log marriage odds ratio regression for men in the 31￿ 35 age
group. The estimated population elasticity is -0.10, which is statistically not di⁄erent from
zero. Column (8) adds the log odds ratio of primary education. The estimated population
elasticity becomes -0.18 and statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. The negative
estimated education elasticity is again not di⁄erent from zero suggesting that the long run
marriage rates of men did not di⁄er by education. The results in columns (7) and (8) do
not suggest any strong departure from CRS in long run male marriage rates.
[TABLE 12 HERE]
Table 12 presents population weighted IV regression results. The instrument for log
number of individuals by gender and age is the log population of the city. The columns
correspond to the similarly numbered columns in Table 11. By comparing the results for the
same numbered columns in Tables 11 and 12, one can see that the results are essentially the
same between the two tables. Thus, instrumenting the number of individuals by gender and
age does not change the conclusion that there is minimal evidence of IRS in both short and
long run marriage rates in China. A ￿rst approximation is that Chinese marriage markets
are characterized by CRS.9
5.2 City Size and Total Gains to Marriage
Table 13 presents population weighted total gains to marriage regressions.
In column (1), the dependent variable is the total gains to marriage between 21￿ 25 years
old women and 24￿ 28 years old men for each city. The independent variable is the log of
the geometric mean of the populations of those women and men for each city. The OLS
estimated population elasticity is -0.270 and it is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Column (2) adds the log odds ratio of educated men and women as additional regressors.
The OLS estimated population elasticity is -0.143 and it is statistically signi￿cant at the
5% level.
Columns (3) and (4) estimate the total gains for women in the 31￿ 35 age group and
men in the 34￿ 38 age group. In column (3), the estimated population elasticity is -0.198
and it is statistically signi￿cant. Adding educational regressors in column (4) changes the
estimated population elasticity to -0.123. It is now only signi￿cant at the 5% level. Thus,
the total gains estimates suggest that the long run total gains to marriage in China in 1982
is best approximated by CRS.
[TABLE 13 HERE]
Columns (5) to (8) re-estimate columns (1) to (4) using log of the total population as an
instrument for 1
2 lnnfnm. There is little di⁄erence between the OLS and the IV estimates
for the younger age match (compare columns [5] and [6] with [1] and [2], respectively). Here
the evidence suggests that larger cities have lower total gains for these young marriages.
9We have also run the equivalent unweighted regressions for Tables 11 and 12 and the results largely do
not change.
19The estimates of ￿mf in columns (7) and (8) are di⁄erent from those in columns (3)
and (4). Although statistically not di⁄erent from zero, the point estimates in (7) and (8)
are positive, unlike the estimated coe¢ cients for younger marriages. At the 95% con￿dence
interval, the upper bound estimate for ￿mf is 0.14 from column (7). This estimate implies
that a doubling of the population will increase total gains to marriage by 0:097, which is
less than 20% of the standard deviation of the total gains to marriage across cities. So while
we cannot reject the hypothesis of CRS for the older matches, we can also not reject mild
IRS.
6 Concluding Remarks
The empirical results on marriage rates and marriage gains from our three data sets and
di⁄erent empirical methods are consistent with each other. Given the widely di⁄erent
circumstances of the three societies in terms of geography, time periods, social norms, and
population size di⁄erences, the similar estimates for returns to scale parameters in all three
data sets are remarkable.
CRS is a reasonable approximation for marriage markets. Using a 95% con￿dence
interval upper bound estimate for ￿mf, there is mild evidence for IRS in some speci￿cations.
Even in these most favorable cases, the quantitative e⁄ects are small. A doubling of the
population cannot increase total gains by more than 30% of a standard deviation of total
gains across observations. Also, there is more evidence in favor of DRS in Chinese marriage
markets.
In order to rule out IRS, which does not show up in marriage rates or marriage gains, we
also investigated the relationship between a proxy for average marital quality, the proportion
of children in the 1￿ 6 age group who live with two parents, and population in a city. There
is little evidence of a such positive relationship in 2000 US census. We also investigated
the relationship between city size and educational attainment of 16 year olds living with
two married parents. The evidence suggest that, controlling for parental characteristics,
education attainment fell with city size.
These ￿ndings suggest that economists should focus on models of the marriage mar-
ket that deliver CRS. One rationale for the CRS ￿nding is that, given their individual
characteristics, marriage within a narrow age window is a compelling experience for most
individuals. This customary narrow age window of marriage adjusts due to income equal-
ity (as also found by Gould and Passerman), educational attainment and other factors.
Exogenous population variation is not one of these factors.
20TABLE 1￿ Summary Statistics, United States 2000
Mean Standard Observations
deviation (no. of cities)
City population 810787.1 1278090 248
Men (age 27￿ 31), women (age 25￿ 29)
Male marriage rate 0.484 0.063 248
Female marriage rate 0.507 0.069 248
Log male marriage odds ratio ￿ 0.061 0.258 248
Log female marriage odds ratio 0.032 0.283 248
Total gains to marriage ￿ 0.567 0.277 248
Men (age 27￿ 31)
Married men 13501.24 20702.69 248
Total number of men 29899.75 50690.39 248
Fraction of white non-Hispanic men 0.695 0.169 248
Fraction of black non-Hispanic men 0.110 0.094 247
Fraction of Hispanic men 0.137 0.156 245
Fraction of men with college education 0.250 0.092 248
Mean family income of married men 10703 0.175 248
Variance, family income of married men 0.923 0.556 248
Women (age 25￿ 29)
Married women 13272.79 20430.38 248
Total number of women 28417.72 48995.97 248
Fraction of white non-Hispanic women 0.686 0.176 248
Fraction of black non-Hispanic women 0.125 0.113 241
Fraction of Hispanic women 0.130 0.157 245
Fraction of women with college education 0.282 0.097 248
Mean family income of married women 10682 0.168 248
Variance, family income of married women 0.971 0.602 248
Source: U.S. 2000 Census (5% random sample of the population).
21TABLE 2￿ Marriage Odds Ratio Regressions, United States 2000
Dependent Variable = ln
￿
n￿￿
Men Men Men Women Women Women
27￿ 31 27￿ 31 27￿ 31 25￿ 29 25￿ 29 25￿ 29
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(men 27￿ 31) ￿ 0.133 ￿ 0.028 ￿ 0.048
(0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
White men (27￿ 31)
Men (27￿ 31) 0.511 0.472
(0.189) (0.198)
Black men (27￿ 31)
Men (27￿ 31) 0.079 0.100
(0.216) (0.220)
Men (27￿ 31), college
Men (27￿ 31) ￿ 2.071 ￿ 1.990
(0.338) (0.359)
Mean family income ￿ 0.127 ￿ 0.113
(0.114) (0.112)
Variance family income ￿ 0.062 ￿ 0.062
(0.027) (0.027)
ln(women 25￿ 29) ￿ 0.166 0.010 ￿ 0.021
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030)
White women (25￿ 29)
Women (25￿ 29) 0.671 0.618
(0.129) (0.139)
Black women (25￿ 29)
Women (25￿ 29) ￿ 0.514 ￿ 0.481
(0.206) (0.209)
Women (25￿ 29), college
Women (25￿ 29) ￿ 2.166 ￿ 2.129
(0.298) (0.310)
Mean family income ￿ 0.622 ￿ 0.533
(0.171) (0.173)





R-squared 0.19 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.66 0.65
Number of cities 248 247 247 248 241 241
Note: Regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿ = number of currently married individuals. n = total number of inviduals.
Men 27￿ 31 = number of men age 27￿ 31. Women 25￿ 29 = number of women age 25￿ 29.
Men (27￿ 31), college = number of men age 27￿ 31 with college degree. Women (25￿ 29), college =
number of women age 25￿ 29 with college degree.
Men1980
7￿11 = number of men who were 7￿ 11 years old in 1980. Women1980
5￿9 = number of women who
were 5￿ 9 in 1980.
22TABLE 3￿ Total Gains to Marriage Regressions, United States 2000
Dependent Variable = gains to marriage
￿mf = ln￿mf ￿ 1
2 (ln￿m0 + ln￿f0)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1
2 (ln nm + ln nf) ￿ 0.047 0.010 ￿ 0.045 0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
White men (27￿ 31)
Men (27￿ 31) 0.463 0.482
(1.027) (1.029)
Black men (27￿ 31)
Men (27￿ 31) 0.101 0.125
(1.289) (1.305)
Men (27￿ 31), college
Men (27￿ 31) 0.974 0.976
(1.061) (1.057)
Mean income, married men 27￿ 31 ￿ 0.467 ￿ 0.469
(0.522) (0.519)
Variance income, married men 27￿ 31 ￿ 0.036 ￿ 0.036
(0.091) (0.091)
White women (25￿ 29)
Women (25￿ 29) 0.240 0.227
(0.872) (0.871)
Black women (25￿ 29)
Women (25￿ 29) ￿ 0.433 ￿ 0.454
(1.092) (1.106)
Women (25￿ 29), college
Women (25￿ 29) ￿ 1.551 ￿ 1.554
(0.928) (0.924)
Mean income, married women 25￿ 29 ￿ 0.061 ￿ 0.064
(0.544) (0.546)








R-squared 0.126 0.539 0.126 0.539
Number of cities 248 241 248 241
Source: U.S. 2000 Census (5% random sample of the population).
Note: regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿mf = number of marriages between men age 27￿ 31 and women age 25￿ 29.
￿m0 = number of unmarried men in the 27￿ 31 age group.
￿f0 = number of unmarried women in the 25￿ 29 age group.
nm = total number of men in the 27￿ 31 age group.
nf = total number of women in the 25￿ 29 age group.
Men1980
7￿11 = number of men who were 7￿ 11 years old in 1980. Women1980
5￿9 = number of women who
were 5￿ 9 in 1980.
23TABLE 4￿ Marital Output Regressions, United States 2000
Dependent Variable =
ln (
children (age 1-6) living with two parents
children (age 1-6) )
(1) (2) (3)
ln(population) ￿ 0.016 ￿ 0.015 ￿ 0.015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006)
Race and education controls No Yes Yes
Region dummies No No Yes
R-squared 0.04 0.45 0.55
Number of cities 248 241 241
Source: U.S. 2000 Census (5% random sample of the population).
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
Children (1￿ 6) = number of children in the 1￿ 6 age group.
24TABLE 5￿ Marital Output Regressions, United States 2000
Dependent Variable
Years of education of 16-year Dummy = 1 if 16-year old children
old children of married couples attained median education
(1) (2)
ln(population) ￿ 0.004 0.012
(0.014) (0.016)
Boy dummy ￿ 0.144 ￿ 0.053
(0.011) (0.005)
Father￿ s age 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Mother￿ s age 0.010 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Father￿ s education 0.018 0.006
(0.007) (0.003)
Mother￿ s education 0.021 0.006
(0.008) (0.002)
F x M education ￿ 0.119 ￿ 0.042
(0.047) (0.020)




Source: U.S. 2000 Census (5% random sample of the population).
Note: standard errors clustered by city in parentheses.
Median education refers to the median years of education of 16-year old children in the state where
the city is located.
ln(population) is the log of population size in each city.
Father￿ s education = father￿ s years of schooling.
Mother￿ s education = mother￿ s years of schooling.
F x M education =
father￿ s years of schooling x mother￿ s years of schooling
100 .
Race dummies are eight dummy variables that control for the race of the married couple. The
categories are (father white, mother black), (father white, mother Hispanic), (father black, mother
white), (father black, mother black), (father black, mother Hispanic), (father Hispanic, mother
white), (father Hispanic, mother black), (father Hispanic, mother Hispanic). The left out category
is (father white, mother white).
25TABLE 6
Marriages by Type of Match, Medieval Tuscany
Years
1260￿ 1299 1340￿ 1360 1420￿ 1435
Urban groom ￿urban bride 17.9 31.7 44.7
Rural groom ￿rural bride 74.1 61.0 49.7
Urban groom ￿rural bride 5.7 2.7 3.6
Rural groom ￿urban bride 2.3 4.7 0.1
Number of marriage contracts 475 2955 3721
Source: State Archives of Florence, Notarile Antecosimiano, 794 volumes of notarial deeds (see
Botticini 2006 for details).
Note: The numbers are the percentages of marriages by type of match.
TABLE 7
Marriage Patterns by Gender, Tuscany 1427
Standard Number of
Mean deviation observations
Male marriage rate (men age 22￿ 32) 0.518 ￿ 22179
Male marriage rate (men age 30￿ 39) 0.749 ￿ 15427
Female marriage rate (age 18￿ 27) 0.838 ￿ 18961
Female marriage rate (age 25￿ 34) 0.926 ￿ 16135
Assets per householda; b 263.9 1534.0 61328
Assets per adult individualc 119.1 627.5 58225
Source: Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, 1427 Florentine Catasto machine readable data ￿le.
a Assets per household refer to the household￿ s total wealth (in gold ￿ orins) as given in the 1427
Florentine census. This was equal to the present discounted value (at 7 percent interest rate) of the
income from houses, land holdings, commercial partnerships, plus loans to private individuals and
shares of the public debt, minus household￿ s total debt.
b For men, household wealth refers to either their own wealth (if their parents were no longer alive),
or to the wealth of the natal household in which they kept living even after marriage. In contrast,
as brides moved into their grooms￿households upon marriage, in the 1427 census their wealth is
identi￿ed with the wealth of their husbands￿households. Given the high degree of positive assortative
matching in marriage, using the husband￿ s wealth instead of the natal household￿ s wealth for married
women is not a major concern.
c Assets per adult individual = household￿ s total wealth
number of adult individuals in the household where an adult individual is
one who is 19 or older.
26TABLE 8
Marriage Odds Ratio Regressions, Tuscany 1427
Dependent Variable = ln
￿
n￿￿
Men Men Men Men
22￿ 32 22￿ 32 22￿ 32 22￿ 32
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
ln(men 22￿ 32) ￿ 0.035 ￿ 0.037 0.007 ￿ 0.015
(0.153) (0.056) (0.141) (0.061)
ln(assets) ￿ 0.353 ￿ 0.353
(0.089) (0.090)
Instrument ln(population) ln(population)
R-squared 0.00 0.55 ￿ ￿
Number of observations 29 29 29 29
Women Women Women Women
18￿ 27 18￿ 27 18￿ 27 18￿ 27
OLS OLS IV IV
(5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(women 18￿ 27) ￿ 0.038 ￿ 0.023 0.024 0.030




R-squared 0.00 0.02 ￿ ￿
Number of districts 29 29 29 29
Source: Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, 1427 Florentine Catasto machine readable data ￿le.
Note: regressions weighted by district population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿ = number of currently married individuals. n = total number of inviduals.
Men 22￿ 32 = number of men in the 22￿ 32 age group.
Women 18￿ 27 = number of women in the 18￿ 27 age group.
ln (assets) = log (household￿ s total wealth). See Table 7￿ s footnote for the de￿nition of total wealth.
ln (assets per adult) = log ( household￿ s total wealth
number of adult individuals in the household).
27TABLE 9
Total Gains to Marriage Regressions, Tuscany 1427
Dependent Variable = ￿mf
= ln￿mf ￿ 1
2 (ln ￿m0 + ln ￿f0)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1
2 (ln nm + ln nf) ￿ 0.012 ￿ 0.027 0.021 0.009
(0.131) (0.092) (0.132) (0.100)
ln (assets per adult) ￿ 0.206 ￿ 0.205
(0.149) (0.153)
Instrument ln (pop) ln (pop)
R-squared 0.00 0.13
Number of districts 29 29 29 29
Source: see Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, 1427 Florentine Catasto machine readable data ￿le.
Note: regressions weighted by district population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿mf = number of marriages between men in the 22￿ 32 age group and women in the 18￿ 27 age
group.
￿m0 = number of unmarried men in the 22￿ 32 age group.
￿f0 = number of unmarried women in the 18￿ 27 age group.
nm = total number of men in the 22￿ 32 age group.
nf = total number of women in the 18￿ 27 age group.
ln (pop) = log (total population in a given district).
ln (assets per adult) = log ( household￿ s total wealth
number of adult individuals in the household).
TABLE 10
Marriage Patterns by Gender, China 1982
Number of
Mean observations
Proportion of married men (age 24￿ 28) 0.582 87696
Proportion of married men (age 29￿ 33) 0.903 66938
Proportion of married women (age 21￿ 25) 0.456 72143
Proportion of married women (age 26￿ 30) 0.965 75382
Proportion of men who completed primary school 0.968 154634
Proportion of women who completed primary school 0.917 147525
Number of cities 245
Source: 1982 Census of China (1% random sample of the population).
28TABLE 11
Marriage Odds Ratio Regressions (OLS), China 1982
Dependent Variable = ln
￿
n￿￿
Men Men Men Men
24￿ 28 24￿ 28 34￿ 38 34￿ 38
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (men 24￿ 28) ￿ 0.226 ￿ 0.165
(0.092) (0.057)
ln (men 34￿ 38) ￿ 0.103 ￿ 0.181
(0.060) (0.059)
Pm > primary education ￿ 0.115 0.205
(0.106) (0.112)
R-squared 0.160 0.184 0.028 0.087
Number of cities 243 243 217 217
Women Women Women Women
21￿ 25 21￿ 25 31￿ 35 31￿ 35
(5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (women 21￿ 25) ￿ 0.351 ￿ 0.170
(0.067) (0.041)
ln (women 31￿ 35) ￿ 0.243 ￿ 0.020
(0.099) (0.066)
Pf > primary education ￿ 0.320 ￿ 0.474
(0.046) (0.065)
R-squared 0.378 0.600 0.108 0.423
Number of cities 243 240 203 203
Source: 1982 Census of China (1% random sample of the population).
Note: regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
ln (men 24￿ 28) = log (number of men in the 24￿ 28 age group).
ln (men 34￿ 38) = log (number of men in the 34￿ 38 age group).
ln (women 21￿ 25) = log (number of women in the 21￿ 25 age group).
ln (women 31￿ 35) = log (number of women in the 31￿ 35 age group).
Pm = log odds ratio of men age 24￿ 28 (in column 2) and age 34￿ 38 (in column 4), who have
completed primary education in a given city.
Pf = log odds ratio of women age 21￿ 25 (in column 6) and age 31￿ 35 (in column 8), who have
completed primary education in a given city.
29TABLE 12
Marriage Odds Ratio Regressions (IV), China 1982
Dependent Variable = ln
￿
n￿￿
Men Men Men Men
24￿ 28 24￿ 28 34￿ 38 34￿ 38
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (men 24￿ 28) ￿ 0.224 ￿ 0.166
(0.091) (0.060)
ln (men 34￿ 38) ￿ 0.100 ￿ 0.191
(0.061) (0.056)
Pm > primary education ￿ 0.114 0.210
(0.106) (0.112)
Instrument ln pop ln pop ln pop ln pop
R-squared 0.160 0.184 0.028 0.087
Number of cities 243 243 217 217
Women Women Women Women
21￿ 25 21￿ 25 31￿ 35 31￿ 35
(5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (women 21￿ 25) ￿ 0.314 ￿ 0.145
(0.072) (0.042)
ln (women 31￿ 35) ￿ 0.266 ￿ 0.037
(0.091) (0.061)
Pf > primary education ￿ 0.333 ￿ 0.467
(0.046) (0.063)
Instrument ln pop ln pop ln pop ln pop
R-squared 0.373 0.599 0.107 0.423
Number of cities 243 240 203 203
Source: 1982 Census of China (1% random sample of the population).
Note: regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿ = number of currently married individuals. N = total number of inviduals.
ln (men 24￿ 28) = ln (number of men in the 24￿ 28 age group).
ln (men 34￿ 38) = ln (number of men in the 34￿ 38 age group).
ln (women 21￿ 25) = ln (number of women in the 21￿ 25 age group).
ln (women 31￿ 35) = ln (number of women in the 31￿ 35 age group).
Pm = log odds ratio of men age 24￿ 28 (in column 2) and age 34￿ 38 (in column 4), who have
completed primary education in a given city.
Pf = log odds ratio of women age 21￿ 25 (in column 6) and age 31￿ 35 (in column 8), who have
completed primary education in a given city.
ln (pop) = ln (total population in a given city).
30TABLE 13
Total Gains to Marriage Regressions, China 1982
Dependent Variable = ￿mf
= ln￿mf ￿ 1
2 (ln ￿m0 + ln ￿f0)
Men 24￿ 28 Men 24￿ 28 Men 24￿ 28 Men 24￿ 28
Women 21￿ 25 Women 21￿ 25 Women 21￿ 25 Women 21￿ 25
OLS OLS IV IV





m + ln n21￿25
f
￿
￿ 0.270 ￿ 0.143 ￿ 0.139 ￿ 0.127
(0.080) (0.045) (0.033) (0.032)
P24￿28
m > primary education ￿ 0.182 ￿ 0.017
(0.109) (0.072)
P21￿25
f > primary education ￿ 0.071 ￿ 0.098
(0.079) (0.061)
Instrument ln pop ln pop
R-squared 0.300 0.429 0.104 0.139
Number of cities 243 240 243 240
Men 34￿ 38 Men 34￿ 38 Men 34￿ 38 Men 34￿ 38
Women 31￿ 35 Women 31￿ 35 Women 31￿ 35 Women 31￿ 35
OLS OLS IV IV





m + ln n31￿35
f
￿
￿ 0.198 ￿ 0.123 0.045 0.045
(0.072) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046)
P34￿38
m > primary education ￿ 0.211 ￿ 0.037
(0.133) (0.105)
P31￿35
f > primary education 0.036 0.032
(0.115) (0.088)
Instrument ln pop ln pop
R-squared 0.141 0.198 0.011 0.012
Number of cities 189 189 189 189
Source: 1982 Census of China (1% random sample of the population).
Note: regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿mf = number of marriages between men in a given age group and women in a given age group.
￿m0 = number of unmarried men in a given age group.
￿f0 = number of unmarried women in a given age group.
nm = total number of men in a given age group.
nf = total number of women in a given age group.
Pm = log odds ratio of men age 24￿ 28 (in column 2) and age 34￿ 38 (in column 4), who have
completed primary education in a given city.
Pf = log odds ratio of women age 21￿ 25 (in column 6) and age 31￿ 35 (in column 8), who have
completed primary education in a given city.
log (pop) = log (total population in a given city).
31TABLE A.1
Marriage Regressions (1st Stage IV), United States 2000
Dependent Variable





White men (27￿ 31)
Men (27￿ 31) ￿ 1.056
(0.233)
Black men (27￿ 31)
Men (27￿ 31) ￿ 0.621
(0.352)
fraction of 27-31 males ￿bachelor + 1.204
(0.486)
Mean income, married men 27￿ 31 0.218
(0.350)





White women (25￿ 29)
Women (25￿ 29) ￿ 0.806
(0.286)
Black women (25￿ 29)
Women (25￿ 29) ￿ 0.390
(0.320)
fraction of 25-29 females ￿bachelor + 0.945
(0.454)
Mean income, married women 25￿ 29 0.134
(0.292)
Variance income, married women 25￿ 29 ￿ 0.066
(0.093)
R-squared 0.90 0.91
Number of cities 247 241
Source: U.S. 2000 census.
Note: regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.
ln (men 27￿ 31) = log (number of men in the 27￿ 31 age group).
ln (women 25￿ 29) = log (number of women in the 25￿ 29 age group).
ln (men1980
7￿11) = log (number of men who were 7￿ 11 years old in 1980).
ln (women1980
5￿9 ) = log (number of women who were 5￿ 9 years old in 1980).
32TABLE A2
1427 Florentine Catasto: the 29 Districts
Population size
District no. Name of city or rural area (number of households)
1 Florence 9780
2 Rural quarter of S. Spirito (countryside of Florence) 7530
3 Rural quarter of S. Croce (countryside of Florence) 4881
4 Rural quarter of S. Maria Novella (countryside of Florence) 7369
5 Rural quarter of S. Giovanni (countryside of Florence) 7147
6 Cortona 898
7 Countryside of Cortona 1121
8 Castiglion Fiorentino (city and countryside) 559
9 Montepulciano (city and countryside) 733
10 Arezzo 1194
11 Countryside of Arezzo 3694
12 Mountain villages near Arezzo 1194
13 Pisa 1740
14 Countryside of Pisa 3966
15 Pistoia 1247
16 Countryside of Pistoia 2043
17 Mountain villages near Pistoaia 492
18 Rural villages in the Garfagnana area 175
29 Towns and rural villages in Val di Nievole 1262
20 Towns and rural villages in Val d￿ Arno di Sotto 642
21 San Gimignano (city and countryside) 576
22 Colle 571
23 Volterra 797
24 Coutryside of Volterra 751
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